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Abstract 
Science and Technology (S&T) programs serve an important function in the defense acquisition 
process as the initial phase leading to discovery and development of warfighting technology. The 
results of these programs impact the larger Major Defense Acquisition Programs that integrate 
the technologies in subsequent phases of the lifecycle. Despite this important role, little prior 
research has examined the performance of S&T programs. Therefore, we investigate the impact 
of technological maturation as a critical success factor in S&T programs. The results suggest that 
S&T programs with mature technologies are more likely to experience above average cost growth 
and larger contract values while being less likely to experience schedule growth. Additionally, we 
find the partnership method between the government and contractor matters for both 
technological maturation and schedule growth. Lastly, the nature of the S&T program is 
important, with aerospace programs more likely to technologically mature than human systems 
programs. 
An Analysis of Science and Technology Program Performance 
Program management focuses on cost, schedule, and performance as the three key 
measures of success (Meredith & Mantel, 2003; Pinto & Slevin, 1998). A large body of literature 
identifies critical factors that lead to program success in both private industry (Nasir & 
Sahibuddin, 2011; Pinto & Slevin, 1987; Zwikael & Globerson, 2006) and the public sector 
(Rendon, 2012; Rodriguez-Segura et al., 2016; Tishler et al., 1996). Prior analyses of program 
performance in defense programs, however, have focused almost exclusively on larger, more 
mature programs that have reached the Engineering Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase 
of the lifecycle or beyond. An abundance of studies exploring cost growth or schedule growth 
can be found for these Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs; Bolten et al., 2008; 
Cancian, 2010; Smirnoff & Hicks, 2008). Missing from the literature is an exploration of smaller 
programs that feed basic science and technologies to subsequent acquisition programs or that 
develop new systems and technologies on a smaller scale. These are the Science and 
Technology (S&T) programs that are undertaken in defense research labs. This article seeks to 
bridge that gap through an exploratory analysis of program performance in Air Force S&T 
programs. 
Importance of Science and Technology 
The vision to implement science and technology as a centerpiece of our nation’s 
airpower strategy has been around since 1945 (Duffner, 2000). General H. H. “Hap” Arnold, 
commanding general of the Army Air Forces, enlisted the aid of leading aeronautics scientist Dr. 
Theodore von Karman to lead the first of these efforts, recommending the creation of an agency 
devoted exclusively to aeronautical research and development (Gorn, 1988). Over time, that 
agency has evolved to what is known today as the Air Force Research Laboratories (AFRL; 
Duffner, 2000). 
S&T’s enduring importance is demonstrated in the 2019 publication of the Air Force 
Science and Technology Strategy for 2030. The 2030 S&T strategy aligns with the National 
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Defense Strategy to empower S&T programs to develop and deliver warfighting capabilities 
rapidly and effectively (U.S. Air Force, 2019). How does S&T fulfill this need? S&T functions as 
the initial phase of the acquisition process by which technologies are matured and, where 
appropriate, transitioned for acquisition by the Air Force (Office of the Chief Scientist of the U.S. 
Air Force, 2010). Continual advancement in these cutting-edge technologies is crucial, as the 
Air Force faces ever-changing threats and adversarial advancements in technology. 
The Anatomy of Air Force Research Labs 
The S&T data analyzed in this paper are from AFRL programs. A brief organizational 
description is provided for those unfamiliar with the laboratories. AFRL is headquartered at 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (AFB) in Ohio. It is comprised of nine technology directorates 
in the continental United States and four locations overseas in Hawaii, the United Kingdom, 
Chile, and Japan, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: AFRL Locations and Major Offices 
 
Each technology directorate focuses on the development and innovation of leading-edge 
technologies and is separated by technological capabilities. A list of AFRL’s technology 
directorates, office symbols, and program descriptions are provided in Table 1. The analysis of 
individual technical directorates will be one of the ways this research segments the data. 
 
Table 1: AFRL Technology Directorates 
Technology Directorate Symbol Program Descriptions 
Air Force Office of Scientific 
 
AFOSR Basic Research Manager for AFRL 
711th Human Performance Wing RH Aerospace Medicine, Human Systems Integration 
Directed Energy Directorate RD Laser, Electromagnetics, Electro-Optics 
Information Directorate RI Information Fusion, Exploitation, Networking 
Aerospace Systems Directorate RQ Aerodynamics, Flight Control, Engines, Propulsion 
Space Vehicle Directorate RV Space-Based Surveillance, Capability Protection 
Munitions Directorate RW Air-Launched Munitions 
Materials & Manufacturing 
 
RX Aircraft, Spacecraft, Missiles, Rockets 
Sensors Directorate RY Sensors for Reconnaissance, Surveillance 
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Measures of Success: The Role of Technology Readiness Levels 
The General Accounting Office (GAO) has identified technology maturation as a critical 
success factor in product development (GAO, 1999). The Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) 
approach to incorporate this critical success factor has been to emphasize Technology 
Readiness Levels (TRLs) as a measure for selecting mature technologies for inclusion in a 
program (DoD, 2011). The TRL concept was developed by NASA (Sadin et al., 1989) and has 
subsequently been adopted by AFRL. A TRL is a tool to measure the technology maturity of a 
system or subsystem using a nine-level ordinal scale (DoD, 2011). Detailed TRL definitions and 
descriptions can be found in Appendix A. 
It is believed that “programs that enter the Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
(EMD) phase of the Defense Acquisition System and have immature technologies will incur cost 
growth and schedule slippage” (DoD, 2009). In an effort to reduce the risk associated with 
entering the EMD phase of the acquisition lifecycle at Milestone B, DoD Instruction 5000.02 
requires technologies to be demonstrated in a relevant environment (i.e., obtain a TRL of at least 
6; DoD, 2011). AFRL, through the S&T programs it oversees, serves a key role in the creation 
and maturation of these technologies to reach those thresholds. 
Despite TRLs being identified as a critical success factor, the literature is sparse with 
empirical examinations. The dearth of analysis is particularly acute for S&T type programs, but 
even MDAPs have relatively few studies examining TRLs. Dubos et al. (2008) analyzed the 
relationship between technology uncertainty and schedule slippage in the space industry. Their 
research resulted in the creation of TRL-schedule-risk curves that are intended to assist 
program managers to make informed decisions regarding the appropriate TRL to consider when 
confronted with schedule constraints. The research of Dubos et al. (2008) suggested a close 
relationship between technology uncertainty and schedule risk, where the more mature a 
technology is (the higher the TRL), the less potential schedule slippage. 
Katz et al. (2015) specifically studied the relationship of TRLs to cost and schedule 
changes during the EMD phase. They found that weapon systems that achieved a TRL of 7 or 
greater at Milestone B had a lower probability of schedule slippage during the EMD phase than 
weapons systems that had a TRL of less than 7. While Katz et al. (2015) found evidence to 
suggest that technology maturity is related to schedule change, they did not find a relationship 
with cost changes. 
Smoker and Smith (2007), however, found evidence that suggests costs vary 
exponentially across time as the system’s technology progresses through each TRL. Similarly, 
Linick (2017) found that as the TRL increased throughout the development phase, the percentage 
of the development cost increased at an increasing rate. As shown by the literature, the extant 
TRL studies are primarily focused on programs once they reach the EMD stage. To the best of 
our knowledge, there are no studies that focus solely on S&T programs—a gap this paper is 
designed to fill. 
Data 
The data for this research was obtained from the AFRL cost and economics division. 
S&T programs typically fall below the dollar threshold for traditional standardized reporting 
such as Contract Performance Reports (CPRs). Instead, the S&T programs receive Funds and 
Man-Hour Expenditure Reports (FMERs). These FMERs provide the procuring activity visibility 
into the contractor’s expenditures for labor, materials and parts, travel, subcontractors, and other 
charges. Like CPRs, these reports are required on a periodic basis from the contractor, usually 
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monthly. Unlike CPRs, FMERs do not report standardized cost elements like the ones found in 
MIL-STD-881D. The initial AFRL dataset consisted of 165 S&T programs with contract start 
dates spanning from 2009 to 2017. 
Research Summary Reports were also collected for these programs. These reports are 
generated at the start of the program (Initial), during the program (Periodic), and at the end of the 
program (Final). Research Summary Reports include general information such as the program 
title, lead technical directorate, and start/end dates. They also include DoD-required information 
such as performance type, joint capability area, Air Force technical capabilities, and TRLs. An 
example of a Research Summary Report can be found in Appendix B.  
Of the 165 programs obtained from AFRL, 43 are included in the final dataset. Table 2 
provides the exclusion criteria and associated number of programs remaining in the analysis.  
 





Programs Obtained from AFRL  165 
Missing Elements 64 101 
Inadequate TD Sample Size 10 91 
Less Than 92.5% Complete 48 43 
Final Dataset for Analysis  43 
 
As shown in Table 2, programs which had missing elements are excluded. These 64 
programs had their costs reported on the FMER in unique ways to include cost burn rates, 
earned value management graphs, total costs in phases, or simply an overall total cost or labor 
hours spent. These reporting methods lack the specific elements needed in this analysis to 
compute percentages of total cost which are used to observe the program’s behavior. Of the 
101 remaining programs, 10 programs fall under four different technical directorates (RD, RI, 
RX, and RY). Each technical directorate represents unique programs with different 
characteristics which precluded aggregation above the technical directorate level. Therefore, the 
small sample size in these directorates would likely skew the analysis results, especially when 
observing how these programs behave at the technical directorate level. For these reasons, the 
programs are excluded from the analysis. Finally, programs with a completion percentage of 
less than 92.5% are excluded from the dataset. A program’s completion percentage is 
computed using the total cost from the last available FMER to the program’s contract value at 
that time. Previous research determined that a program with a completion percentage of 92.5% 
or greater accurately predicts the final cost of the program (Tracy & White, 2011). The final 
number of programs in the dataset is 43, which is sufficient to conduct a robust analysis. 
Methods: Contingency Table Analysis 
The dataset consists largely of qualitative variables. Therefore, the methodological 
approach employed is a two-way contingency table analysis. This type of analysis is used to 
summarize the relationship between two categorical variables based on the data observed. The 
contingency table analysis uses a 2 × 2 table to test for independence. For each test, the same 
type of hypothesis test will be implemented, as shown in Equation 1: 
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𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜: The two classifications are independent 
(1)  
𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑎: The two classifications are dependent 
 
The chi-square distribution is the test statistic used for considering inferences about the 
category probabilities. If there is a failure to reject the null, the two variables are independent 
and are not statistically related to one another. If the null is rejected, then the variables are 
dependent, and a statistical relationship exists between them. The two-way contingency 
analysis examines the categorical variables (see Table 3) with subsequent discussion on the 
rationale behind variable selection and categorization. 
When highly significant results are found, one of the benefits of a contingency table is 
that odds ratios and their associated confidence intervals can be produced. An odds ratio is a 
measure of association for a two-way contingency table. The ratio is the odds of an event 
occurring in one group to the odds of the same event occurring in another group. In other words, 
the odds ratio is the ratio of the probability of a property being present compared to the 
probability of it being absent. If the odds ratio is 1, the two events are independent. 
 
Table 3. Categorical Variables Used in Contingency Table Analysis 
Categorical Variables 
Technical Directorate Cost Growth > 0% 
Performance Type Cost Growth > 33.7% 
TRL Increase Cost Growth > 44.1% 
Last Known TRL ≥ 6 Cost Growth > 56.5% 
Final TRL ≥ 6 Cost Growth > 60.5% 
TRL 1 – 3 Cost Growth > 68% 
TRL 4 – 5 Contract Value > $1M 
TRL 6 – 7 Contract Value > $3M 
TRL 8 – 9   
Schedule Growth > 0%   
Schedule Growth > 33%   
Schedule Growth > 63%   
 
Categorical variables for the Technical Directorate (TD), Performance Type, and TRLs 
are obtained from the Research Summary Reports. The TD variable denotes which AFRL 
directorate is the lead on the program. Such a variable may capture 
organizational/managerial/technological differences. For this dataset, the TD variable is either 
RH or RQ. (This limitation is due to the sample size of the other TDs as previously discussed.) 
The performance type represents the partnership method between AFRL and the contractor. 
This variable consists of Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) and Small 
Business Innovative Research (SBIR) relationships. This type of variable may capture 
differences due to the size, skills, or knowledge of the company types (e.g., small versus large 
companies). TRL data for the S&T programs are used in seven different categorical variables. 
TRL Increase indicates if the TRL increases at any point during the program’s lifecycle. Last 
Known TRL ≥ 6 denotes the last reported TRL of the program, while Final TRL ≥ 6 only 
analyzes programs that have a Final Research Summary Report. The decision to categorize 
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based on TRL level 6 is due to the role this TRL level fulfills in the defense acquisition process. 
Specifically, a TRL of 6 is equivalent to demonstration in a relevant environment which is 
needed for a program to enter Milestone B (DoD, 2011). Four variables were created by 
grouping TRLs based on the maturity of the technology and the product’s requirements, as 
determined in the literature (GAO, 1999). See Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Using TRLs to Match Technology With Requirements  
(GAO, 1999) 
 
Additional variables of interest created from the Research Summary Report contract 
information include schedule growth, cost growth, and contract value. These attributes are 
commonly studied for acquisition programs at all phases of their lifecycles. 
The variables for cost growth, schedule growth, and contract value have been converted 
from continuous variables to categorical variables in order to be included in the contingency 
table analysis. Binary (or dummy) variables with methodical break points were created in order 
to test the relationships at different locations. These breakpoints were derived either from the 
literature review or from descriptive statistics of the variable itself in the dataset with its mean 
and/or median. For example, the mean cost growth of the dataset was 68%, which led to the 
creation of a dummy variable (Cost Growth > 68%), separating programs that are above and 
below the sample mean. Likewise, Bolten et al. (2008) distinguished mean and median 
percentages of total DoD and Air Force acquisition program development cost percentages. 
These thresholds from Bolten et al. (2008) are also examined. A summary of the break points 
can be seen in Table 4.  
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Table 4. Break Point Summary 
Category 
Break 
Point Reason Source 
Schedule Growth 0% Any growth Dataset 
  33% Median Dataset 
  63% Mean Dataset 
Cost Growth 0% Any growth Dataset 
  33.7% DoD Development – Median Bolten et al. (2008) 
  44.1% Air Force Development - Median Bolten et al. (2008) 
  56.5% DoD Development – Mean Bolten et al. (2008) 
  60.5% Air Force Development - Mean Bolten et al. (2008) 
  68% Mean Dataset 
Contract Value $1M Median Dataset 
  $3M Mean Dataset 
 
Results and Discussion 
The contingency table results are organized into four sections: technical directorate, 
performance type, TRL, and growth relationships. Using the chi-square distribution as the test 
statistic, relationships are identified when Pearson’s chi-squared test is significant at a p-value 
of less than 0.10. For highly significant results (p-value < 0.01), the odds ratio and its associated 
confidence interval are analyzed. It is important to note the possibility of spurious relationships. 
Spurious relationships occur when the two variables are associated but not causally related, 
possibly due to an unknown mediating variable. With the sheer number of 2 × 2 tables 
generated in this analysis, spurious relationships are possible. Therefore, only highly statistically 
significant results (p-value < 0.01) will be studied in detail (i.e., full contingency table shown), 
while the other significant variables are observed solely as potential findings. 
Technical Directorate 
The TD categorical variable denotes which AFRL directorate is the lead on the 
respective program: either RH (Airman Systems) or RQ (Aerospace Systems). Analyzing the TD 
variable resulted in 19 contingency tables to be tested for significance. Two variables were 
significant at an alpha of 0.10, and two were significant at an alpha of 0.05. The full set of test 
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Table 5. Contingency Table Results for Technical Directorate 
 
 
TRL Increase is the only TRL variable with a statistically significant relationship to TD. 
This test suggests that it is more probable to have a program’s TRL increase with RQ 
(Aerospace Systems) programs than with RH (Airman/Human Systems) programs. The RQ 
programs are comprised primarily of engine and propulsion (hardware) system technologies. 
The ability to transition RQ through TRL levels may be due to the relationship of hardware 
versus software (human systems interactions). It is likely easier to make advancements in 
hardware technologies as the testing, failures, and efficiencies may be more conclusive. 
Similarly, the contingency table results suggest that RQ programs are more probable to 
have cost growth as well as schedule growth that is greater than 33% (the dataset’s median) and 
63% (the dataset’s mean). This could be related to the maturing technology (increasing the TRL) 
of RQ programs. If the technology is maturing, a program office may be more likely to increase 
funding and schedule to keep the maturation on track. If the technologies do not mature, it could 
be that the agile nature of S&T programs allows for early decisions to cancel programs. In 




Last Known TRL ≥ 6





Schedule Growth > 0%
Schedule Growth > 33% (Median) **
Schedule Growth > 63% (Mean) *
Contract Value > $1.0M (Median)
Contract Value > $3.0M (Mean)
Cost Growth > 0% *
Cost Growth > 33.7% (DoD Dev - Median)
Cost Growth > 44.1% (AF Dev - Median)
Cost Growth > 56.5% (DoD Dev - Mean)
Cost Growth > 60.5% (AF Dev - Mean)
Cost Growth > 68% (Mean)
Total Significant Contingency Tables: 4
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have cost growth, and have schedule growth (greater than the dataset mean and median) when 
compared to RH programs. 
Performance Type 
The performance type variable represents the partnership method between AFRL and 
the contractor: either Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) or Small Business 
Innovative Research (SBIR) relationships. This variable formed 19 contingency tables to be 
tested for significance. One variable was significant at an alpha of 0.10, two variables were 
significant at an alpha of 0.05, and two variables were significant at an alpha of 0.01. The full set 
of test results is provided in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Contingency Table Results for Performance Type 
 
 
Table 6 test results suggest that an S&T program with an RDT&E performance type is 
more likely to have or end with a TRL of at least 6 than an SBIR type program is. SBIR 
programs are developed by small domestic businesses, which potentially provides an agile way 
to stimulate high-tech innovation. But RDT&E programs are dominated by the larger, more 
experienced defense contractors. These results suggest that the larger defense contractors may 
obtain contracts with more mature technologies due to their capacity and ability to develop 






Last Known TRL ≥ 6 **





Schedule Growth > 0% *
Schedule Growth > 33% (Median)
Schedule Growth > 63% (Mean)
Contract Value > $1.0M (Median) ***
Contract Value > $3.0M (Mean) ***
Cost Growth > 0%
Cost Growth > 33.7% (DoD Dev - Median)
Cost Growth > 44.1% (AF Dev - Median)
Cost Growth > 56.5% (DoD Dev - Mean)
Cost Growth > 60.5% (AF Dev - Mean)
Cost Growth > 68% (Mean)
Total Significant Contingency Tables: 5
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Furthermore, as a potential indication of RDT&E and SBIR working different kinds of 
programs from the start, one can observe that it is more probable to have contract values 
greater than $1 million (the dataset’s median) with RDT&E performance types, as seen in 
Figure 3. Testing significance when the contract value is greater than $3 million (the dataset’s 
mean) produces similar results to Figure 3, with an even smaller p-value. Again, this could be 
due to the differences in the types of contractors involved in RDT&E and SBIR programs. Larger 
defense contractors possibly obtain larger programs because they have more breadth of 
experience or capacity, while the small businesses obtain smaller contracts with a more 
constrained objective; the acquisition community often sees a similar relationship when the 
large defense contractors are prime on a large system and smaller vendors are subcontractors 
for a particular subsystem. Additionally, SBIR programs may target uncertain and risky 
technologies that small businesses research so that AFRL can evaluate which programs have 
the potential to develop into mature technologies. The scale of these uncertain programs may 
contribute to lower contract values. In fact, the odds ratio indicates that given the program has 
an SBIR performance type, the odds of the contract value being less than $1 million is 9.7 times 
higher than when the program has an RDT&E performance type. 
 
 
Figure 3. Contingency Table of Performance Type by Contract Value > $1 Million 
 
The Table 6 contingency test results also suggest that a program with an SBIR 
performance type is more likely to have schedule growth. While test results indicate that RDT&E 
programs are more likely to have higher TRL levels, the opposite could be said in that SBIR 
programs are more likely to have lower TRL levels. Less is known about these immature 
technologies, which could lead these small businesses to spend more time developing them, 
leading to schedule slippage. This result is consistent with the literature findings of Dubos et al. 
(2008). 
In summary, the results suggest that a program that has a performance type of RDT&E 
is more likely to have a TRL of 6. Furthermore, highly significant results point to evidence that a 
program that has a performance type of RDT&E is more likely to have a contract value greater 
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Technology Readiness Level 
TRL data was used to create seven different binary variables, as previously discussed. 
These seven TRL variables were tested for significance against the 11 performance variables to 
produce 77 contingency tables. Seven variables were significant at an alpha of 0.10, four 
variables were significant at an alpha of 0.05, and one variable was significant at an alpha of 
0.01. Despite registering significant Pearson p-values, the contingency table results for the 
seven significant variables at an alpha of 0.10 were found to be invalid. For all seven tests, the 
expected counts of two of the four cells were less than five. This violates an assumption for a 
valid chi-squared contingency table test, which states the sample size should be large enough 
so that the estimated expected count will be equal to five or more. As a further check, Fisher’s 
Exact Test—which is a non-parametric test for small samples—found all seven tests to be non-
significant. This result was largely due to the small number of programs with a TRL of 6–7 (5) 
and a Final TRL of ≥ 6 (4). The full set of test results is provided in Table 7 with special 
subscript designators on those test results deemed invalid. 
  
Table 7. Significant Contingency Tables for Technology Readiness Level 
 
 
The contingency table results suggest that an S&T program is more likely to have cost 
growth greater than 68% (the dataset’s mean) with a TRL of 6 or 7 but less likely to have 
schedule growth with a TRL ≥ 6. Such a finding, perhaps unusual for a development program, is 
both intuitive and precedent in an S&T context. With an early TRL (1–5), there is little 
knowledge of how the technology will mature. This poses a problem to program managers and 
cost estimators. As technologies mature, investments are made, which allow costs to grow over 
their initial estimates. As the technology integrates into a demonstration effort (TRL 6–8), the 















































Schedule Growth > 0% ** *1 *1
Schedule Growth > 33% (Median)
Schedule Growth > 63% (Mean)
Contract Value > $1.0M (Median) **
Contract Value > $3.0M (Mean) ** ***
Cost Growth > 0% *1
Cost Growth > 33.7% (DoD Dev - Median) *1
Cost Growth > 44.1% (AF Dev - Median) *1
Cost Growth > 56.5% (DoD Dev - Mean) *1
Cost Growth > 60.5% (AF Dev - Mean) *1
Cost Growth > 68% (Mean) **
Total Significant Contingency Tables: 0 2 1 1 0 8 0
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These results support previous literature conducted on Air Force programs which concluded 
that estimated costs vary exponentially across time with the progression through the various 
TRLs (Smoker & Smith, 2007). However, for more mature technologies, there is a broader 
knowledge base available for the technology’s development due to more completed research. 
With a higher TRL, and thus more knowledge of the technology available, the better the chance 
of meeting schedule requirements (Dubos et al., 2008). This literature finding is also consistent 
with the results found here. 
Table 7 results also suggest that an S&T program is more likely to have contract values 
greater than $3 million (the dataset’s mean) with a TRL of 6 or greater and less likely to have 
contract values greater than $1 million (the dataset’s median) with a TRL of 1–3. The 
explanation is consistent with the aforementioned cost growth finding. As the program’s 
technology matures, additional investments are made, as shown in the contingency analysis 
results in Figure 4. In fact, the odds ratio indicates that given the program has a TRL of 6 or 7, 
the odds of the contract value being greater than $3 million is 14.5 times higher than a program 
with a TRL other than 6 or 7. 
 
 
Figure 4. Contingency Table of TRL 6–7 by Contract Value > $3 Million 
 
In summary, the TRL results suggest that programs with mature technologies are more 
likely to experience larger than average cost growth and larger contract values. Additionally, 
these programs are less likely to experience schedule growth. Furthermore, the results suggest 
that programs with immature technologies are less likely to have larger contract values. 
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Growth Relationships 
As previously shown, variables for TD, performance type, and TRL were tested for their 
relationships with cost growth, schedule growth, and contract value. An analysis was also 
conducted among these latter variables to analyze their relationships to each other; a total of 63 
relationships were tested for significance. Eight tests were significant at an alpha of 0.10, 11 
tests were significant at an alpha of 0.05, and 22 tests were significant at an alpha of 0.01. The 
full set of test results is provided in Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Significant Contingency Tables for Growth Relationships 
 
 
The contingency table results suggest that it is more probable for S&T programs with 
larger contract values to experience cost growth. Observing cost growth relationships with the 
original two contract value variables (using the mean and median of the dataset) provided highly 
significant results. To explore the sensitivity of these relationships relative to the threshold used 
to define the binary variables, additional contract value variables were created with lower and 
higher breakpoints. This additional analysis found contract values greater than $0.9 million to be 
the lowest threshold for which a statistically significant relationship could be found with amount 
of cost growth (i.e., cost growth > 0%). As the contract value threshold increased, additional 
cost growth variables displayed statistical significance until all were significant at a contract 
value of $3 million. This suggests that cost growth and contract value have a positive correlation 
























































































































Contract Value > $0.9M ** ** 2
Contract Value > $1.0M (Median) 0
Contract Value > $3.0M (Mean) 0
Contract Value > $4.0M 0
Contract Value > $5.0M 0
Cost Growth > 0% ** *** *** *** *** ** ** * 8
Cost Growth > 33.7% (DoD Dev - Median) * * *** *** *** *** ** 7
Cost Growth > 44.1% (AF Dev - Median) * * *** *** *** *** ** 7
Cost Growth > 56.5% (DoD Dev - Mean) * ** *** *** *** ** 6
Cost Growth > 60.5% (AF Dev - Mean) * ** *** *** *** ** 6
Cost Growth > 68% (Mean) * *** *** *** *** 5
Total Significant Contingency Tables: 5 7 7 1 3 6 6 6 41
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Table 8 results also suggest that it is more probable for S&T programs with contract 
values greater than $0.9 million to experience schedule growth above the median and mean (i.e., 
greater than 33% and 63%, respectively). This was the only contract value variable to result in 
significant p-values when tested with schedule growth variables. These results imply that 
programs with contract values less than $0.9 million are less likely to experience schedule 
growth. 
Finally, the results suggest that if S&T programs are experiencing schedule growth, then 
it is more likely that they’re also experiencing cost growth. This seems to contradict the findings 
that programs with mature technologies are more likely to experience cost growth while being 
less likely to experience schedule growth. But further analysis of these results suggests that 
programs with large schedule growth percentages are even more likely to experience cost growth 
at all amounts. This is because it is the immature technology programs that are experiencing both 
the schedule and cost growth. 
In summary, the results suggest that S&T programs with larger contract values 
experience cost growth, while programs with smaller contract values are less likely to experience 
schedule growth. Finally, analyzing the relationship between cost and schedule growth suggests 
that programs with schedule growth are more likely to have cost growth as well. Deeper analysis 
revealed that this schedule growth/cost growth relationship is found in those programs with 
immature technologies. 
Conclusion 
S&T programs serve an important role in the defense acquisition process. They 
constitute the initial phase of the acquisition process through discovery and development of 
warfighting technology. The results of these programs impact the larger MDAPs that integrate 
the technologies in subsequent phases of the lifecycle. Despite this important role, little prior 
research has examined the performance of S&T programs. Thus, the overarching goal of this 
paper was to discern new insights from an analysis of S&T program characteristics in relation to 
their program’s performance. 
The literature review identified technological maturity as a critical success factor in 
product development (GAO, 1999). One measure defense programs use for technological 
maturity is TRL levels. TRLs, therefore, were an integral component under investigation in this 
analysis. The objective was to understand how TRLs affect S&T program performance. There 
are several key findings. 
First, the results suggest that aerospace programs are more likely to technologically 
mature when compared to human system programs. In other words, the AFRL aerospace 
programs are more likely to increase the TRLs in their programs. To the extent that 
technological maturity is a measure of success, the aerospace programs outperform. However, 
this technical performance comes at a cost, as the aerospace programs were also more likely to 
experience cost and schedule growth. Intuitively, these results are compatible; with proven 
success in technology maturation, increases in funding and schedule are likely to keep the 
maturation on track. 
Second, the partnership method between the government and contractor matters. The 
partnerships for S&T programs consist of SBIR and RDT&E relationships. The RDT&E 
programs are more likely to have and end with a TRL of 6 or more in comparison to SBIR 
programs. The result is not entirely surprising because, by definition, the larger defense 
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companies comprise the RDT&E category. These larger companies have the capacity and 
resources to mature technology that the smaller SBIR companies may not possess. 
Third, TRLs and program performance are linked. The relationships with TRLs suggest 
that programs with mature technologies are more likely to experience above-average cost 
growth and larger contract values while less likely to experience schedule growth. Additionally, 
the results suggest that programs with immature technologies are less likely to have larger 
contract values. As technologies mature, additional funds for investments are made, which 
increases costs over their initial contract values. This is likely to happen when the program is 
met with new and unexpected challenges as the technology integrates into a demonstration 
effort (TRL 6–8). Linick (2017) found that as the TRL increased throughout the development 
phase, the percentage of the development cost increased at an increasing rate. This literature 
finding is in agreement with these results. Conversely, as these technologies mature, there is a 
broader knowledge base for their development, which increases the chance of meeting 
schedule requirements. 
Lastly, the analysis of “growth” variables (cost growth, schedule growth, and contract 
value) provides additional insights on S&T programs. Specifically, the analysis suggests that 
S&T programs with larger contract values experience larger cost growth at the same time 
programs with smaller contract values are less likely to experience schedule growth. Further 
analyzing the relationship between cost and schedule growth, the results suggest that if 
programs have larger schedule growth, then they are more likely to have larger cost growth as 
well. Deeper analysis revealed that this schedule growth/cost growth relationship is found in 
those programs with immature technologies. 
Prior examinations of S&T programs are scarce. Thus, the possibilities for future 
research are vast. The exploratory analysis conducted here focused solely on AFRL programs. 
S&T programs in the other military services warrant examination. Additionally, one of the more 
surprising aspects of the data obtained from S&T programs was the reported TRL at various 
stages of the program’s lifecycle. In order for a program to advance past Milestone B into the 
EMD phase, a program must have a TRL of 6 or greater. Further research into those S&T 
programs whose technology matured (TRL increased) could identify common characteristics 
which indicate a higher probability of technological maturation. The exploratory analysis 
provided here was just the first step of the journey. Through future research and discoveries, the 
knowledge needed to increase the odds for successful S&T programs is possible. 
 
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. 
 
Appendix A. TRL Definitions, Descriptions, and Supporting Information 
TRL Definition Description Supporting Information 
1 Basic principles 
observed and 
reported. 
Lowest level of technology readiness. 
Scientific research begins to be 
translated into applied research and 
development (R&D). Examples might 
include paper studies of a 
technology’s basic properties. 
Published research that 
identifies the principles that 
underlie this technology. 




Invention begins. Once basic 
principles are observed, practical 
Publications or other references 
that outline the application 
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TRL Definition Description Supporting Information 
application 
formulated. 
applications can be invented. 
Applications are speculative, and 
there may be no proof or detailed 
analysis to support the assumptions. 
Examples are limited to analytic 
studies. 
being considered and that 
provide analysis to support the 
concept. 





Active R&D is initiated. This includes 
analytical studies and laboratory 
studies to physically validate the 
analytical predictions of separate 
elements of the technology. 
Examples include components that 
are not yet integrated or 
representative. 
Results of laboratory tests 
performed to measure 
parameters of interest and 
comparison to analytical 
predictions for critical 
subsystems. References to 
who, where, and when these 
tests and comparisons were 
performed. 
4 Component and/or 
breadboard 
validation in a 
laboratory 
environment. 
Basic technological components are 
integrated to establish that they will 
work together. This is relatively “low 
fidelity” compared with the eventual 
system. Examples include integration 
of “ad hoc” hardware in the 
laboratory. 
System concepts that have 
been considered and results 
from testing laboratory scale 
breadboard(s). References to 
who did this work and when. 
Provide an estimate of how 
breadboard hardware and test 
results differ from the expected 
system goals. 
5 Component and/or 
breadboard 
validation in a 
relevant 
environment. 
Fidelity of breadboard technology 
increases significantly. The basic 
technological components are 
integrated with reasonably realistic 
supporting elements so they can be 
tested in a simulated environment. 
Examples include “high-fidelity” 
laboratory integration of components. 
Results from testing laboratory 
breadboard system are 
integrated with other supporting 
elements in a simulated 
operational environment. How 
does the “relevant environment” 
differ from the expected 
operational environment? How 
do the test results compare with 
expectations? What problems, 
if any, were encountered? Was 
the breadboard system refined 
to more nearly match the 
expected system goals? 
6 System/subsystem 
model or prototype 
demonstration in a 
relevant 
environment. 
Representative model or prototype 
system, which is well beyond that of 
TRL 5, is tested in a relevant 
environment. Represents a major 
step up in a technology’s 
demonstrated readiness. Examples 
include testing a prototype in a high-
fidelity laboratory environment or in a 
simulated operational environment. 
Results from laboratory testing 
of a prototype system that is 
near the desired configuration 
in terms of performance, 
weight, and volume. How did 
the test environment differ from 
the operational environment? 
Who performed the tests? How 
did the test compare with 
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TRL Definition Description Supporting Information 
expectations? What problems, 
if any, were encountered? What 
are/were the plans, options, or 
actions to resolve problems 
before moving to the next 
level? 
7 System prototype 
demonstration in an 
operational 
environment. 
Prototype near or at planned 
operational system. Represents a 
major step up from TRL 6 by 
requiring demonstration of an actual 
system prototype in an operational 
environment (e.g., in an aircraft, in a 
vehicle, or in space). 
Results from testing a prototype 
system in an operational 
environment. Who performed 
the tests? How did the test 
compare with expectations? 
What problems, if any, were 
encountered? What are/were 
the plans, options, or actions to 
resolve problems before 
moving to the next level? 





Technology has been proven to work 
in its final form and under expected 
conditions. In almost all cases, this 
TRL represents the end of true 
system development. Examples 
include developmental test and 
evaluation (DT&E) of the system in 
its intended weapon system to 
determine if it meets design 
specifications. 
Results of testing the system in 
its final configuration under the 
expected range of 
environmental conditions in 
which it will be expected to 
operate. Assessment of 
whether it will meet its 
operational requirements. What 
problems, if any, were 
encountered? What are/were 
the plans, options, or actions to 
resolve problems before 
finalizing the design? 




Actual application of the technology 
in its final form and under mission 
conditions, such as those 
encountered in operational test and 
evaluation (OT&E). Examples include 
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